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The purpose of this thesis paper is to test the efficiency of Hang Seng Index 
futures market by examining the ex ante profitability exploited by a simple arbitrage 
strategy. The efficiency tests reported attempt to approximate conditions in the cash and 
futures markets by executing simulated orders of the simple arbitrage strategy on historical 
data. The transactions data to the nearest second are used in this paper. The cost-of-carry 
model is the cornerstone of the pricing relationship between index futures prices and stock 
indices. This model is adapted for incorporating the effect of execution lags and 
transaction costs. 
Although the frequency of ex post violations of futures boundaries conditions is 
non-trivial and the violations predict significant amount of profits available, the mispricing 
reversals of the futures are so fast that most mispricing signals are eliminated within the 
short execution lag. Only limited arbitrage opportunities exist for brokers and no arbitrage 
opportunity exists for institutional investors. The average profits exploited from the 
opportunities are small and the standard deviations of the profits are large relative to the 
average profits. The evidence generally supports that Hang Seng Index futures market is 
efficient with respect to the simple arbitrage strategy. The non-zero returns to brokers 
from the arbitrage can be explained as the premium of execution risk. 
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Since stock index futures contracts were first introduced in the U.S. market in 
1982，they have rapidly gained widespread success all over the world. Many markets 
followed the experience of the U.S. and introduced their own index futures contracts. On 
6th May 1986, Hang Seng Index (HSI) futures were introduced by the Hong Kong 
Futures Exchange (HKFE). On 3rd September 1986，the Singapore International 
Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) introduced futures contracts on a Japanese stock index -
Nikkei Stock Average (NSA). On 9th June 1987, the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) 
introduced Osaka Stock Futures 50. The popularity has soon proliferated under different 
economic systems and jurisdictions because the use of these important derivatives can 
serve a variety of investment purposes by substantially modifying the risk and return 
exposure of conventional stock investment. 
In a perfectly efficient market, futures prices are derived from the values of their 
underlying assets. The pricing relationship between the index futures and the stock indices 
should always hold; otherwise arbitrageurs will step in to exploit any profit resulted from 
the violation of the relationship and eventually restore the relationship. The stability of the 
pricing relationship is important to portfolio management because stock index futures are 
indispensable investment instruments of hedging the risk of uncertain market movements. 
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Unfortunately, our market exists plenty of inefficiencies such as restrictions on short sale, 
transaction costs, and execution risks etc, which may create obstacles to arbitrage. The 
basis variability may be so sizeable that makes the hedging between stock portfolio and 
stock index futures difficult. The hedging effectiveness or the usefulness of stock index 
futures in portfolio management depends on how efficient the index futures market is. 
The purpose of this thesis paper is to test the efficiency of Hang Seng Index 
futures market by examining the ex ante profitability exploited by a simple arbitrage 
strategy. After a history of more than 100 years，the stock market in Hong Kong has 
become one of the most important markets in the world for both international and local 
investors. In 1993，the market capitalization of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
(SEHK) reached the sixth largest in the world and the second largest in Asia. Over the 
past few years, the rate of growth was still very high due to a strong local economy, the 
increasing foreign investment and the increasing participation of Chinese companies. By 
the end of 1996, the daily trading value of the SEHK amounts to approximately 10 billion 
Hong Kong dollars and the daily trading volume ofHSI futures amounts to approximately 
17000 contracts. The importance of Hong Kong's financial markets makes the studies on 
the efficiency of Hang Seng Index futures market both valuable and interesting. 
The cost-of-carry model proposed by Cornell and French (1983) is the most 
important foundation of the pricing relationship between stock indices and stock index 
futures. Assuming i)no transaction costs and dividends, ii)perfect capital markets, and 
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iii)constant and equal risk free interest rate, the model states that futures price for a non-
dividend paying stock must equal the deferred value of the current price. 
F(t,T)=P(t)eKT_t) G)， 
where F(t，T) is the futures price at time t for a contract that matures at T. P(t) is the stock 
price at time t, and r is the risk free interest rate. Equation (1) is derived from a simple 
arbitrage argument. Suppose the futures price exceeds the value given by equation (1)， 
F(t，T) > P(t)er(T-t)，an arbitrageur will i)borrow P(t) and purchase one share of stock at 
time t and ii)short one futures contract. The initial value of a futures contract is zero, so 
no cash is required to create the portfolio. At time T, the portfolio generates three cash 
flows: i)-P(t)er(T-t} from the debt，ii)P(T) from the stock and iii)F(t，T)-P(T) from the stock 
futures position. The total payoff is F(t,T) -P(t)er (T_t). The arbitrageur earns a riskless 
profit without any investment. An influx of arbitrage activities are attracted that makes the 
futures price decline and stock price increase until equation (1) holds again. If the futures 
price is lower than the value implied by equation (1), F(t，T) < P(t)er(T_t), still an arbitrageur 
can earn a riskless profit by i)short selling one share of stock and lending the proceeds at 
the risk free rate and ii)longing one futures contract. The initial cash requirement is zero. 
The payoffs from the strategy at time T are i)P(t)er(T-t) from the risk free lending ,ii)-P(T) 
from closing the short position in the stock and iii) P(T)-F(t,T) from the long futures 
position. The profit is the total payoff, P(t)er(T4)-F(t，T). The influx of arbitrageurs once 
again restores the equilibrium of equation (1). 
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The perfect relation given by equation (1) is too simple to be true. The arbitrage 
argument implicit in the model relies on many market and institutional factors. Since the 
cost-of-carry model was introduced in 1983，researchers have continued to modify the 
model by incorporating the effect of stochastic interest rate, short sale restrictions, tax 
effects and execution lag into the model that make the applying of the arbitrage strategy in 
true market conditions more realistic. 
The theory of efficient markets proposed by Fama (1970) provides the theoretical 
framework for empirical tests on the index futures market efficiency. The theory states 
that a market in which prices always "fully reflect" available information is efficient. 
Hence, arbitrageurs cannot profit from the index futures market. The frequency of 
arbitrage opportunities and the size of arbitrage profitability can reflect how efficient a 
market is. The methodology presented in this paper resembles the studies of Chung (1991) 
and Klemkosky et al.(1991) on the U.S. market with the consideration of the market 
characteristics of Hong Kong. The efficiency tests reported attempt to approximate 
conditions in the cash and futures markets by executing simulated orders of the simple 
arbitrage strategy on historical data. The transactions data to the nearest second are used 
in this paper. The use of these data is an improvement on the studies which use daily 
closing data or reported index quotations because of the following reasons: i)constituent 
stocks are not traded continuously, so reported index quotations revised every minute lag 
the spot index. ii)prices fluctuate frequently and substantially with each trading day. iii)the 
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cash and futures market are closed at different times. Some recent research based on more 
detailed data shows that the previous research using daily data or reported index 
quotations tend to overestimate the departures of the futures from their theoretical levels， 
consequently concluding an inefficient market. In addition, the test focuses on the 
frequency and size of ex ante profits obtained from undertaking the arbitrage rather than 
ex post violations of theoretical boundary conditions. The ex post violation of boundary 
conditions only indicates a mispricing signal but may not be an exploitable profit. The ex 
ante test examines the profits after a reasonable execution lag of undertaking the arbitrage 
strategy following the observation of any ex post mispricing signal. It is a more realistic 
situation than the test that simply assumes arbitrageurs execute at their observed prices 
without any execution lag. 
The results of the tests support that Hang Seng Index futures market is efficient. 
The profits generated from the simple arbitrage are small and volatile. Only brokers with 
low transaction costs are able to exploit the profits. The profits are not risk free but only 
the premium of the execution risk. When comparing the profitability of long arbitrage and 
short arbitrage, we find that more arbitrage opportunities exist for long arbitrage. This is a 
result different from that documented in the U.S. and Japan. We explain the results by the 
difference in speculative activity and the deregulation of stock trading and futures trading 
in Hong Kong. 
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The paper is organized as follows. After the introduction paragraph, the historical 
background and regulatory concerns of trading HSI futures and HSI stocks are introduced 
in Chapter 2. Following Chapter 2, we briefly review the literature on the relative pricing 
between stock index futures and stock indices in different markets in Chapter 3. The 
information provided by the existing literature gives important implications for the 
methodology and results. In Chapter 4，we explain the efficiency tests in details and 
illustrate their applications based on an imaginary example. Chapter 5 introduces the 
characteristics and sources of all the data used in every test, chart and graph. Chapter 6 
reports the results of different tests. Finally in the concluding chapter, we interpret the 
results and discuss them in the context of the institutional framework and market 




This chapter briefly discusses the history, trading methods and some regulatory 
concerns of the stock market and the stock index futures market in Hong Kong. The 
discussion reflects the rising importance of the two markets and provides important 
information on the index arbitrage profitability and the efficiency of the index futures 
market. The chapter is organized into two sections. The first section discusses the stock 
market and is divided into four subsections, which review the history, trading mechanism, 
short sale restrictions and Hang Seng Index respectively. The second section discusses 
Hang Seng Index fijtures market and is divided into subsections, which review the history 
and trading methods of it respectively. 
2.1 Stock Trading in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong has the largest stock market in Asia outside Japan. The market is 
characterized by a high degree of liquidity, a high level of daily turnover and a large share 
of foreign investment. Hong Kong's favorable geographical time zone, strong links to 
China and the free market, excellent infrastructure continue to facilitate its development 
into one of the most important financial centre in the world. The performance over time of 
this important market is measured by the leading local index - Hang Seng Index. 
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2.1.1 History and Recent Trend 
The history of share trading in Hong Kong can be traced back to 1866，one year 
after the enactment of the First Companies Ordinance. The first stock exchange was 
established in 1891 and renamed as the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1914. In 1969，the 
monopoly of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange was broken by the Far East Stock 
Exchange. In 1971 and 1972, the third Stock Exchange _ Kam Ngan Stock Exchange and 
the fourth one - the Kowloon Stock Exchange were established respectively. The 
flourishing of stock exchanges were largely caused by the stock market boom in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The exuberant speculation during the market boom eventually led 
to the crash in 1973. The crash in 1973 called for the setting up of a new regulatory 
framework for the securities industry. Finally, the Securities Ordinance and the Protection 
of Investors Ordinance were both enacted in February 1974. 
In 1986’ the four former exchanges were unified into one exchange known as the 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). Following the opening of the SEHK，Hong 
Kong witnessed another stock market boom. Prompted by a global bull market and strong 
local economy, the boom continued until 19th October 1987, when a worldwide stock 
crash occurred. The leading stock index, Hang Seng Index, plummeted by 43% during the 
crash. The officials of the SEHK responded with the closure of the SEHK for four days 
following the day of the crash. 
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Stepping into 1990s，the market has recovered quickly from the adverse 
performance caused by the stock crash in 1987 and the Tiananmen Incidence in 1989. 
Aside from 1994，the market capitalization and trading value have grown every year in the 
90s and reached the levels of 3476 billion and 1412 billion respectively in 1996. China 
funded companies and Chinese enterprises have begun their listings in the SEHK since 
1993. Because of the rapid growth of China's economy and the increasing ties between 
Hong Kong and China, China related companies have played a more and more important 
role in the stock market of Hong Kong in recent years. Over the past seven years, Hang 
Seng Index has risen from 2836.6 to 13451.45，the index more than quadrupled. The 
number of listed companies has also increased from 299 to 583. A strong local property 
sector, rapid development of the Chinese companies and increasing foreign investment are 
the primary reasons for the high growth rate. 
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2.1.2 Trading Mechanism of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
The stock market in Hong Kong is an order-driven market, which means the 
liquidity provided by recording and matching traders' orders rather than by some 
specialists acting as market makers. A trader can place two types of orders, known as limit 
orders and market orders. Market orders instruct the broker to buy or sell the stock at the 
immediately available lowest price or highest price. Limit orders specify ceiling prices for 
buying orders and floor prices for selling orders. 
Prior to November 1993，the trading on the SEHK was conducted manually 
through either the use of the SEHK's internal telephone or through face-to-face 
negotiation. In November 1993，the SEHK introduced the Automated Order Matching 
and Execution System (AMS) to accommodate the increasing market demand. 
Conventional manual trading and automated trading serve together to match a maximal 
number of orders. Under the new system, orders in respect to automatch stocks are 
entered to the terminal of AMS and displayed on the screen. The orders are time stamped 
and then automatched based on price/time priority. This ensures that an order with the 
best price which is entered first will be executed first. The computerization of the trading 
system can greatly increase the number of orders recorded in the system and enhance a 
speedier match, thereby increasing the liquidity and capacity of the system. Now most of 
the orders are automatched but manual trading still exists for some special orders such as 
large board trading. The payment and delivery related to the trading should be settled 
11 
under a ‘t+2，system. That means the buyer and the seller should fulfill their obligations 
within two days after the trading. In order to minimize the counterparty risk, Hong Kong 
Securities Clearing Company Ltd. (HKSCC) serves as the settlement counterparty to all 
broker participants. 
2.1.3 Short Sale Restrictions 
Short selling is the process that a trader sells a stock which he or she does not 
own. The existence of a stock borrowing and lending market is a prerequisite for short 
selling activity. Short sellers borrow the shares from the lender to settle their outstanding 
trades and return the shares when they close the position. This process is essential to 
sophisticated investment strategies related to futures and options market but excess 
speculative short selling activities can be extremely risky and in some cases have harmful 
impact on the stock market. Short selling is an indispensable process in implementing short 
arbitrage strategy. 
Supervisory institutions in different countries have different regulations on short 
selling. Before 1994, short selling was completely prohibited in Hong Kong that made the 
exploitation of an arbitrage profit from short arbitrage strategy impossible. HSI prices 
were more likely to be priced at a discount rather than a premium. In January 1994，the 
SEHK introduced short selling on a limited basis. Although short selling was allowed, the 
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uptick rule1 and the capital constraints on the short selling proceeds might also limit the 
short arbitrage activities. The restrictions have gradually been relaxed. In 1996，113 
designated stocks including all blue chips can be short sold and the uptick rule was 
abolished. However, the following requirements still exist: 
1) only SEHK members registered with the SEHK Short Sellers may sell short; 
2) short selling members must maintain and submit bimonthly detailed records of their 
short selling activity; 
3) short selling members must designate all short sales as such when entering AMS; 
4) stock lender should require the borrower to maintain a minimum margin whose value is 
not less than 105% of the value of the current market value of all borrowed securities and 
mark-to-market these positions. The collateral must be in a readily realizable form and 
acceptable to the lender. 
The restrictions on short selling have important effect on arbitrage profitability. 
After the lifting of the uptick rule, the most important restriction is the requirement of 
collaterals. It may be an impediment to arbitrage because an arbitrageur's ability of 
borrowing stocks is limited by its ability of meeting the collateral requirement. Because 
arbitrageurs are large brokerage houses and institutional investors with adequate ability of 
providing enough collateral for the stock borrowing activities needed in their short 
arbitrage activities, we reasonably assume that the effect of the collateral requirement is 
1 The uptick rule means that short selling is prohibited at the price below “ the current best ask price". It 
is designed to protect the market from excess speculative attack on the downward movement. 
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minimal. Some arbitrageurs can evade the short sale restrictions by using a 'quasi，short 
arbitrage strategy: large investors (e.g. managers of index funds or pension funds) who 
already own index stocks can sell them proportionally, lend the proceeds in the interbank 
market and buy a futures contract. By doing so, arbitrageurs can evade from the short sale 
restrictions and generate the same economic payoffs as the true short arbitrage strategy 
does. 
2.1.4 Hang Seng Index 
Stock market indices measure the historical performance of a market. Returns on 
market indices can also act as an important criteria of evaluating the performance of 
individual portfolios such as mutual funds or unit trusts. Some mutual funds are managed 
by buying the stocks in the same proportions as those used in constructing the index. 
Because the market index is a good representative of the overall performance of the stocks 
existing in the market, many derivatives with index value as underlying assets are created. 
These derivatives facilitate a wider range of feasible strategies in investment management. 
The construction of a useful index is crucial to the future development of the market. 
Hang Seng Index published by Hang Seng Index Services Limited is the most 
popular and widely quoted local stock index in Hong Kong. It is a value weighted index 
which has maintained a number of thirty three stocks accounting for about seventy 
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percentage share of total market capitalization of the SEHK. The computation of HSI is as 
follow: 
market captitalization of the constituent stocks at time t x base day index 
H S I ® 二 market capitalization of the constituent stocks on the base day 
The index was first published in 1969 with original base day on 31st July, 1964. The base 
day index was set at 100. The base day was then shifted to 13th January 1984. The base 
day index was revised to 975.47. 
The HSI is updated on a minute by minute basis during trading hours and is 
disseminated locally and internationally through major media and financial networks. 
Starting from 1986，HSI Services Ltd. has published a Hang Seng Index Daily Bulletin, 
which reports the index and its sub-indices at 15 minute intervals, and the high, low and 
closing for each day. 
15 
Table 1: Statistics of Hang Seng Index (at the end of 1996) 
誦 - q q n j n n n n r r r r - n 我_ __ • a ^ a w w j w ^ ^ ^ a 桑 
Constituent Stocks A 互 
' H S B C 12.68 5.26 
Sun Hung Kai Properties 6.51 3.51 
Hutchison Whampoa 6.32 5.32 
Hang Seng Bank 5.22 2.84 
Cheung Kong Holdings 4.54 3.38 
HK Telecom 4.12 3.38 
Henderson Land Dev 3.81 2.50 
Swire A 3.09 1.43 
New World Development 2.8 2.74 
CITIC Pacific 2.76 1.25 
Wharf 2.52 1.34 
China Light 1.97 1.17 
HK Electric 1.49 0.59 
HK& China Gas 1.29 0.18 
Wheelock 1.28 0.59 
Cathay Pacific 1.1 1.01 
Bank of East Asia 1.09 0.65 
Hysan Development 0,91 0.60 
Amoy Properties 0.8 0.74 
First Pacific 0.68 0,69 
Great Eagle 0.41 0.26 
Guangdong Inv 0.5 0.68 
Hang Lung 0.66 0.40 
Henderson Inv. 0.75 0.83 
HK & Shanghai Hotels 0.49 0.34 
Hopewell 0.63 1.29 
Johnson Electric 0.23 0.11 
Oriental Press 0.15 0.21 
SCMP 0.32 0.51 
Shangri-La 0.52 0.46 
Shun Tak 0.22 0.43 
Sino 0.75 0.81 
TVB 0.37 0.25 
70.98 
HSI Closing： 13451.45 
Total Market Capitalization^ ,291.6 billion Hong Kong Dollars 
Note: A = % of market value of all listed stocks 
B = Change in HSI (points) as a result of one spread change in the price of the constituent stock. 
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Table 2: Summary of Important Information on Hang Seng Index (at the end of 1996) 
. r r . r r r - r 
Publisher HSI Services Ltd. 
Date first published November 1969 
Original base day 31 st July, 1964 
Original base index 1 0 0 
Revised base day 13th January, 1984 
Revised base index 91SA1 
Weighting method value weighted 
Number of Stocks 3 3 
% of total market capitalization 70.98 
2.2 Hang Seng Index Futures 
Stock Index futures contracts were first introduced in the U.S. markets in April 
1982. The contracts have rapidly gained widespread success because investors can greatly 
extend their choices of risk and return management strategies. The success of the stock 
index products was soon followed by other markets. On 6th May 1986，the Hong Kong 
Futures Exchange (HKFE) introduced Hang Seng Index Futures. Recovered from the 
confidence crisis of 1987 crash, the HSI futures have evolved into indispensable 
investment tools for local and international investors. 
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2.2.1 History and Recent Trend 
Hang Seng Index futures were introduced by Hong Kong Futures Exchange 
(HKFE) on 6th May, 1986. Soon after the trading in HSI futures contract began, the 
contract became very popular. Its average daily volume grew from about 1800 contracts 
per day in the first month of trading，to more than 25,000 in October 1987. On 11th 
September 1987，the contracts recorded a historical high daily volume of over 40,147 lots 
traded. 
The initial success was rather short-lived. After the stock market crash on 19th 
October 1987, the average daily trading volume shrank from its peak to fewer than 1,000, 
The crash exposed serious flaws in the Hong Kong Futures Exchange's management of 
counterparty risk as well as the inadequacy of the Guarantee Corporation's guaranteeing 
services. Total defaults amounted to approximately HK$1.8 billion. The Futures Exchange 
was restructured and reformed then. 
As a result of the post-crash reform and the recovery of stock market in 1992， 
futures trading became active again. In 1993, the average daily volume reached a level of 
9,702. In 1994，the average daily volume rose by 74% to 16,906 and the daily volume 
recorded a new high of 42,438 on 25th October 1994. In our sample period, November 
1996 to December，1996, the average daily volume is 19957. The high trading volume is 
one of the features of an efficient market. 
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According to the statistics provided by the Hong Kong Futures Exchange, at the 
end of 1996，20.8% of the trading in HSI futures are for the purpose of hedging, 12.1% of 
the trading are for the purpose of arbitrage and 67.1% are for other purposes. Among the 
various types of investors, local retail investors account for the largest proportion -
43.6%. Overseas and local institutional investors together account for 41.7 %，which is 
also very significant. 
19 
Fig.3 





Distribution of HSI Futures Trading by Investors 
Overseas 
Institutional Principal Trading 
Investors 12% 
Local Institutional Local Retail 
Investors o v e r s e a s Retail I n v e s t o r s 
1 7 % Investors 
3% 
source : Market Statistics for December 1996，HKFE 
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2.2.2 Trading and Settling Methods 
Hang Seng Index futures are standardized contracts which stipulate that two 
parties promise to transact at a future date at a specified price. The future dates at which 
traders can transact include the spot month, the next calendar month, and the next two 
calendar quarter months. Although the underlying asset ofHSI futures is actually a basket 
of stocks, all the settlements are in cash. The seller is not required to deliver a basket of 
stocks for settling his or her position at the maturity date. 
The value of a HSI futures contract equals HK$50 multiplied by its settlement 
price. However, the traders are not required to pay the full amount of the contractual 
value to open a position of HSI futures. Instead, they maintain a margin deposit at the 
clearinghouse. The clearinghouse serves as a counterparty to every transaction. At the end 
of each day, the clearinghouse determines the settlement price that is based on the closing 
bid, ask and the last transacted price. If the settlement price is higher than the previous 
day's settlement price, the change in the contractual value is credited to the margin 
accounts of those holding long positions and charged to the margin accounts of those 
holding short positions. If the settlement price is lower than the previous day, the 
difference is credited to those holding short positions and charged to those holding long 
positions. The final settlement price at the maturity is set equal to the average of the 
quotations for the underlying index (spot market) taken at five minute intervals during the 
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last day of trading and rounded down to the nearest whole number. This daily settlement is 




This chapter reviews the studies on relative pricing between stock index futures 
and their underlying stocks, arbitrage profitability and index futures market efficiency. The 
literature review has two purposes: i)share the research experience on this subject with 
readers and ii)provide useful references on the methodology and results presented in this 
paper. Because the availability of intraday data significantly discloses more information on 
this issue, the chapter is categorized into two parts. The first part reviews the research 
works which use daily data and the second part reviews the works which use intraday 
data. 
3.1 Studies of Futures Market Efficiency based on Daily Data 
Early research in the 1980s on the U.S. markets documents significant and 
persistent departures from the cost-of-carry model prices.2 Stock index futures are more 
likely to be sold at a discount on the theoretical prices. The departures and basis variability 
make the hedging between stock index futures and the stock portfolio difficult，thereby 
making stock index futures a less useful tool in risk and return management strategies. 
2 Early research such as Cornell and French (1983)，Figlewski(1984a, 1984b)，Modest and 
Sundaresan(1983), Merrick(1984) using daily data on stock index futures prices and stock indices 
documented persistent deviations between actual futures prices and the theoretical levels. 
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Researchers attempt to find answers to the departures and look for institutional changes 
which can make the index futures more useful in investment management. 
Based on a simple arbitrage argument, Cornell and French (1983) formulate the 
standard cost-of-carry model, which suggests the pricing relation between index futures 
and stock indices. The cost-of-carry relation has soon become the cornerstone of the study 
of relative pricing between stock index futures and their underlying stock indices. Most of 
the following studies on this subject test and elaborate on this model. In addition, Cornell 
and French (1983) attribute the discount of futures prices on the theoretical level to the 
tax timing option. The tax timing option comes from certain tax advantages of stock 
portfolio which a futures lacks. Because taxes are levied only when a transaction occurs, 
the stockholder can save tax by exercising the option of realizing losses and postponing 
gains. However, this option does not exist in the futures market because all capital gains 
and losses should be realized at the maturity of the contract or the end of the year, 
whichever comes first. As a result, it is more accurate to price the futures below the 
theoretical level by an amount equal to the value of the option. 
In his study of hedging performance in stock futures, Figlewski (1984a, b) argues 
that the magnitude of the discount cannot sufficiently be explained by the tax timing 
option. The underpricing can be explained as a situation of market disequilibrium - a 
transitory phenomenon caused by the unfamiliarity with the new markets and institutional 
inertia in developing systems to take advantage of the opportunities present. Once the 
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market matures，the market eliminates approximately 70% of the arbitrage opportunities in 
one day. It is fairly efficient and becoming moreso with time. 
Modest and Sundaresan (1983) are not completely satisfied with the explanation 
that the departure is only a transitory phenomenon. They incorporate transaction costs 
into the cost-of-carry model and look for some trading restrictions that the simple 
arbitrage argument does not consider. They suggest that the restrictions on the use of the 
proceeds from short selling the stock portfolio be considered. Their empirical results 
indicate that investors who can use zero or only half of the proceeds from the short sale 
cannot profit from arbitrage but investors who can make full use of the proceeds can profit 
from it. 
Instead of examining the pricing restrictions implied by arbitrage activity, 
Merrick(1987) uses the prices and volume data to study whether arbitrage related trading 
has been an important activity in the stock and stock index futures market. He finds that 
the arbitrage sector is undercapitalized and insignificant, implying the existence of some 
institutional impediments or hidden costs which make arbitrage unprofitable. 
The studies on the U.K. market and the Japanese market extend the study of the 
cost-of-carry model to different economic and institutional environments. Bailey(1989) 
provides some preliminary evidence on the in the Japanese stock index futures market 
based on the continuous-time futures pricing model and the cost-of-carry model. His 
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results suggest that both of the theoretical models predict the futures prices quite 
accurately, but the basis variability is so sizeable that makes the contract an unreliable 
instrument for hedging stock portfolio. Subrahmanyam and Uno ( 1990) study the 
violations of price boundaries of Nikkei 225 futures implied by the cost-of-carry relation in 
more detail. Their results resemble the experience of the U.S. market such as persistent 
violations of the theoretical price boundaries by futures prices，the futures prices sold at a 
discount rather than a premium. The deviations from the theoretical level have diminished 
in size with time. 
In their study of the index futures prices in the U.K. market before and after the 
Big Bang deregulation, Yadav and Pope (1990) replicate the tests and methods previously 
used in the study of the U.S. market. The replication allows direct comparability of the 
results from the two markets. They find that after the Big Bang deregulation, the size and 
frequency of systematic mispricing violations have considerably decreased and the 
tendency for mispricing reversals has substantially increased. While presenting similar 
results to that in the U.S. index futures market, their results provide further support that 
regulatory restriction is a feasible explanation of the futures mispricings. 
In addition to the strategy of holding the position to expiration, Brennan and 
Schwartz (1990) argue that the option of closing out the arbitrage position before the 
maturity date sometimes brings additional benefits. Taking the transaction costs and 
position limits into account, they attempt to formulate the optimal arbitrage strategy 
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which depends on the stochastic process of the evolution of the simple arbitrage profit. 
They make the assumption that the arbitrage profit from a simple arbitrage argument 
follows a Brownian process. Unfortunately, the parameters estimated based on the 
assumption are not stationary, making the optimal policy difficult to be implemented. 
While the assumption of the Brownian process is not satisfactory, further studies on 
endogenizing the stochastic behavior of the simple arbitrage profit with adequate 
consideration of transaction costs and the structure of the market may help in formulating 
the optimal arbitrage policy. 
These early studies on the futures price mispricings are incomplete in testing 
futures market efficiency for several reasons: i) they use daily data on stock futures and 
spot stock indices, ii) they look at the size and frequency of violations of non-arbitrage 
boundaries, not at the size and frequency of arbitrage profits, and iii) they do not consider 
the execution risk in implementing the index arbitrage. 
3.2 Studies of Futures Market Efficiency based on Intraday Data 
Prices fluctuate substantially and frequently within every minute. Program trading 
allows the execution of all the transactions in the index arbitrage within a very short time, 
leaving plenty of arbitrage opportunities within each trading day. In addition, the data of 
spot indices and stock index futures are asynchronous because futures markets and stock 
3 The arbitrage profits are not risk free because the execution at the observed prices are not guaranteed. 
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markets close at different times. To examine the profitability of index arbitrage and 
efficiency of index futures market, intraday price data should be more definite. 
MacKinlay and Ramaswamy(1988) apply price data of S & P 500 futures contracts 
expiring in September 1983 through June 1987 of every 15 minutes in their study of the 
frequency of violations of the cost-of-carry relation. They report that on average 14.4 
percentage of the time violate the cost-of-carry relation in excess of transaction costs. 
Stoll and Whaley(1990) investigate the time series properties of intraday returns of 
stock index and stock index futures based on the assumption that the cost-of-carry model 
holds at every point of time. He finds that S & P and MM index futures lead the 
underlying spot indices by about five minutes. His conclusion is an evidence supporting 
the price discovery hypothesis that new information disseminates in the futures market 
before the stock market, with index arbitrageurs stepping in quickly to bring the cost-of-
carry relation to alignment. 
Although using intraday prices, MacKinlay et. al. and Stoll et. al. approximate the 
value of the spot index by the reported index quotation. The reported index is not a 
perfect measure of the spot index because the component stocks are not traded 
continuously. Chung(1991) corrects the inadequacy in his efficiency test of MM Index for 
the sample period from 1984 to 1986. He uses transactions data of the component stocks 
to compute the spot index. Furthermore, he incorporates a reasonable execution lag and 
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tests the market efficiency ofMMI by looking at the size and frequency of realized ex ante 
profit rather than by those of the ex post violations. He concludes that the size and 
frequency of boundary violations are significantly smaller than those reported by the 
earlier studies and have declined sharply with time. 
Klemkosky and Lee (1991) study the efficiency of the S & P 500 index futures 
from March 1983 to December 1987. The pricing model in this study incorporates many 
aspects of the prior studies such as transaction costs, differential borrowing and lending 
rates, seasonable dividend payouts and marking to market impact. The test also focuses on 
the frequency and size of ex ante profits as Chung(1990) does. The results show that even 
after 10 minutes execution lag, arbitrage is still profitable. However, the profitability 
decreases with the longer execution lag. Taxes significantly reduce the profitability. 
In the Japanese market, Lim (1992) studies the presence of arbitrage profitability 
and the behavior of how spot and futures prices move within the transaction bounds based 
on intraday data. He shows that the arbitrage opportunities are very limited, a result 
contrasting those of the previous studies on the Japanese market. Within the transaction 
bounds, the futures price changes are strongly and positively correlated with the spot 
index changes. 
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Because of the availability of further detailed data,4 more information on index 
arbitrage can be revealed from the later studies. The results of Sofianos (1993) show that 
the average expected return obtained from the simple arbitrage strategy of holding the 
position until expiration is smaller than the opportunity cost of the arbitrage fund and 70% 
of the arbitrage positions in the sample are closed before expiration. The average early-
closing return is five percentage points above the opportunity cost of the arbitrage fund. 
37% of the arbitrage trades in the sample establish the cash and futures positions non-
simultaneously. These trades, while increasing risk, appear to have little effect on average 
returns. 
In contrast to the idea that arbitrage is essential to mispricing reversals, Kleidon 
(1992)，based on the evidence on the 1987 crash, argues that the negative basis between 
S & P index futures prices and the stock index is due to stale prices. Information at the 
time of the submission of the limit orders cannot be reflected by the synchronous executed 
prices in the cash market because of the large volume of the limit orders congesting the 
market mechanism at the time of crash but no significant delay in the execution of orders 
exist in the futures market. The nonsychroneity causes the negative basis and no formal 
arbitrage is involved in bringing the prices back in alignment. 
4 Sofianos (1993) uses detailed data on 2659 index arbitrage trades on 126 trading days through 15th 
January 1990 to 13th July 1990. The data are obtained from the Daily Program Trading (DPT) reports of 
NYSE members. In these reports, members firms identify their index arbitrage program trades and 
provide information on the cash and futures leg of the transactions. 
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Merton, Muthuswamy and Whaley (1994) proposes that even at the normal time, the 
mean reversion of the index futures prices are not due to arbitrage only. The predictability 
of basis changes is a result of statistical illusion. The opportunity of exploiting arbitrage 
profits by formal arbitrage is very limited. They occur only to counteract the additional 
drag in index adjustment induced by the very special set of rules that the NYSE imposes 
to create the impression of the continuity in the path of prices. 
Biihler and Kempf (1995) studies the mispricing and arbitrage in German markets. 
They use transactions data in futures market and the minute by minute reported index 
quotations data in cash market. Different from the studies of Yadav and Pope(1990), 
Chung (1991) and Klemokosky and Lee (1991)，Biihler and Kempf (1995) require a risk 
premium to cover the execution risk. It is found that the relationship between index and 
futures prices cannot be described by the cost-of-carry model. Futures contracts are 
significantly undervalued. There are a large number of arbitrage signals - most indicating 
short arbitrage opportunities. This is particularly true for futures contracts which are not 
near to delivery. 
Neal (1996) provides a detailed analysis of actual S& P 500 arbitrage trades.The 
pricing model used by Neal incorporates the value of early liquidation option suggested by 
Brennan and Schwartz (1990). This model predicts that an arbitrage position will be 
established when absolute deviation from fair value plus the value of the option to 
liquidate the trade early exceeds the transaction costs of the arbitrage. The results provide 
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several insights into arbitrage trading. First, short-sale restrictions are unlikely to have a 
large effect on the mispricing. Second, the opportunity cost of arbitrage funds exceed the 
Treasury bill rate. Third, the average price discrepancy captured by the model is small. 
Tests of the models provide some support for the arbitrage model that incorporates an 
early liquidation option. 
To summarize, the recent studies generally report a more efficient market than the 
early works report. The improvement in market efficiency largely stems from the 
availability of better models and data, which allow the discovery of more knowledge on 





The chapter of methodology discusses the theoretical framework of formulating 
the hypothesis and the structure of efficiency tests. An example with imaginary figures 
helps to illustrate the execution of index arbitrage and the difference among the tests 
clearly. At last, the transaction costs of undertaking index arbitrage specific to HSI are 
estimated. The chapter uses much information presented in the previous chapters and is 
very important to the interpretation of the empirical results presented in the next chapter. 
4.1 Index Futures Efficiency and Arbitrage Profitability 
According to the theory of efficient markets (Fama，1970)，an efficient market fully 
reflect all available information on the market prices. When it is applied in testing the index 
futures efficiency，the hypothesis is 
E [F t -E(F t |W M ) ] = 0 � -
Ft is the random variable of current futures prices and E(Ft |WM ) is the futures prices 
projected from the information set Wt-丨.Equation (2) shows that the expected profit 
based on information set Wt_, in excess of equilibrium expected prices equals zero. If the 
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index futures market is efficient, the prices in cash market and futures market fully reflect 
the information set Wt.,. The equilibrium condition of the cost-of-carry model is expected 
to always hold: 
E(¥t\WiA) = E ^ I W w X l + vn/365) 一 Div(t,T) (3). 
Assuming that the cash market is efficient, i.e. E[§t - E(S t |W tJ]，we combine (2) and 
(3). Our hypothesis becomes 
E [ f t - 4 ( l + r n / 3 6 5 ) + DiV(t，T)] = 0 W， 
where St is the spot HSI, r is the relevant HIBOR, n is the number of days from t to T, 
and Div(t,T) is the amount of dividends earned from holding the constituent stocks until 
the expiration plus interest on the dividends. Hence, the expected arbitrage profit from a 
large sample of futures prices does not deviate from zero. If the transaction costs are 
taken into account, the no-arbitrage hypothesis becomes 
E[Ft - St(1 + r n / 3 6 5 ) + Div(t，T) ] < transaction costs (5). 
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4.2 Structure of Efficiency Tests 
The main purpose of this paper is to use transactions data of HSI futures and those 
of the constituent stocks of HSI to test index futures market efficiency by examining the 
index arbitrage profitability. The size and frequency of the ex ante profits after an 
execution lag of 30 seconds, 1 minute, 2 minutes, 3 minutes and 5 minutes following the 
observations of ex post mispricing signals are the most important evidence of the test 
because the results are obtained from executing simulated market orders involved in 
implementing index arbitrage. It also analyses the effect of execution lags on the 
profitability. The results of the efficiency test using minute by minute HSI reported quotes 
are reported as some preliminary evidence. The ex post violations of boundary conditions 
indicate mispricing signals. The average size of the positive signal is considered as an 
predictor of the strength of the ex ante profitability. 
4.2.1 Test based on Minute by Minute Reported Index 
Let the size of the violation Ft - S t( l + r n / 3 6 5 ) + Div(t,T) be s. If s is positive 
and I s I is greater than the transaction costs, arbitrageurs can profit from a long arbitrage 
strategy, that is, shorting a futures contract, borrowing at the risk free rate, buying the 
blue chips in proportion to their market shares and holding the position until T. If s is 
negative and |g | is greater than the transaction costs, arbitrageurs can profit from an 
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opposite short arbitrage strategy, that is, buying a futures contract, lending at the risk free 
rate, and short selling the blue chips and holding the position until maturity . 
The reported index at current minute is used to approximate S t , the spot index. 
The reported index is calculated based on the previous transaction prices of the 
constituent stocks and revised at the beginning of every minute. The futures prices and the 
HSI in the first minute of trading are discarded from our sample because it is not 
reasonable to assume that arbitrageurs transact at the prices of the previous close. The 
reported index lag the spot index while there is no significant lag in futures prices. Because 
arbitrage profitability is highly sensitive to time lag，one disadvantage of this test is that the 
mismatch between reported index and futures prices tend to overestimate the frequency of 
violations. 
4.2.2 Ex Post Test based on Transaction Prices of the Constituent Stocks 
St = spot HSI at time t computed from the transaction prices of the constituent stocks 
= Z Pi( tr) Nj x constant 
where t�equals t ifith share is traded at time t; otherwise it equals the closest time prior to 
t when ith share is traded. Pj( i{) equals the price of ith share at time tf. The constant is 
subject to change with any change in the number of outstanding share, for example the 
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distribution of bonus shares, stock splits. In our sample, there is no change in outstanding 
shares for the blue chips, so the constant remains unchanged in the test. 
If any of the constituent stocks does not have its first transaction prior to the 
current futures price, the observation is not regarded as a mispricing signal. The ex post 
test is an improvement over the test based on reported index because there is no time lag 
between spot index and futures price. Nevertheless, the ex post test still assumes that 
arbitrageurs can execute the orders at their observed prices. This assumption is not 
guaranteed in real transactions. If the futures prices or stock prices change quickly and 
substantially, arbitrageurs will be likely to execute at prices very different from the 
observed ones, making ex post violation a poor predictor of profitability. The ex post 
violation can merely be regarded as a mispricing signal but may not be a profitable 
opportunity. 
4.2.3 Ex Ante Test 
Let 8a = Ft+ - St^l+r"7365) + Div(t, T). ( | s a I - transaction costs) becomes the 
realized ex ante arbitrage profit where Ft+ is the first futures price following an execution 
lag after time t. St+ is equal to 2； Pj( ti+) Nj x constant where Pi( ti+) is the first price of the 
ith share following an execution lag after t. If | s a | is greater than the transaction costs, 
arbitrageurs can get an ex ante profit from index arbitrage. Ex ante test relaxes the 
assumption that arbitrageurs execute their orders at observed prices but allows an 
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execution lag for arbitrageurs to place the orders after they observe the ex post mispricing 
signal. Ex Ante test gives a close approximation to market conditions and the ex ante 
profit is the closest estimate to true profit realized by arbitrageurs. 
4.3 An Example for Illustration 
Without loss of generality, we illustrate the implementation of index arbitrage 
strategy and the difference between the three tests by providing a simplified imaginary 
example. The example assumes the following market conditions. i)the market index is 
value weighted and computed from three constituent stocks A, B，and C with 100，200 
and 50 outstanding shares respectively. ii)the investors lend or borrow money at the 
interest rate of 10%. iii)the transaction costs for undertaking all transactions of an index 
arbitrage amount to HK$10. iv)the base day index is 100 and the base day market value 
of constituent stocks is 1000. v)the value of future prices is HK$1 times the futures index. 
Based on the above information, 
i n d e x 二 Market Value of constituent stocks at time t 乂 ^ 一 � 饮 
Market Value of constituent stocks at base day 
一 PA>< N a + P B x N b + P c X N C ， 〈 例 ( 6 ) 
1000 
The following table summarizes the trading record of the index futures and the stocks 
during a period in a certain trading day: 
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10:01:07 $20 300 
10:02:23 $12 300 320 
10:02:34 390*** 300 320 
10:02:38 370** 300 320 
10:02:48 355* 300 320 
10:03:07 360 3 2 0 3 2 0 
10:03:17 $20 320 320 
10:03:19 S5 320 320 
10:03:29 $15 320 350 
10:04:45 380 350 350 
*** - all the three tests indicate that the observation is a profitable arbitrage opportunity 
** - ex post test and ex ante test using transactions data indicate that the observation is a profitable 
opportunity 
* - only the test based on reported index quotations indicates that the observation is a profitable 
opportunity 
4.3.1 Results of the Efficiency Test based on Reported Index Quotations 
It is assumed that arbitrageurs can transact at the prices which are used to compute 
the current reported index quotation. At 10:02:34, they will sell a futures contract, borrow 
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HK$ 300 at the risk free rate and buy the constituent stocks.5 The arbitrageurs hold the 
position until maturity. Suppose we let the settlement price for the index futures be X，the 
payoffs from the strategy include i)$390 -X from the clearinghouse of futures exchange, ii) 
X from selling the constituent stocks,6 and iii) the return of loan plus interest equal to 
$300x(l+10%) = $330. The total payoff is $60. Taking into account transaction costs of 
HK$10, the arbitrageur can still exploit a profit of HK$50. Similarly, the test reports 
mispricings at 10:02:36 and at 10:02:48. 
4.3.2 Results of the Ex Post Test based on Transaction Prices 
At 10:02:23, a new transaction of stock A is executed at HK$12. If arbitrageurs' 
executed price of each stock is the last transacted price of that stock, the observation at 
10:02:48 will no longer be mispriced. When implementing the index arbitrage, we should 
borrow HKS320 to buy the constituent stocks. The net payoff at the maturity date is 
HK$5, which is smaller than the transaction costs. There are two mispricings reported in 
the ex post test based on transaction prices. 
5 The amount of money spent on each stock is proportional to its market value. In this case, 10 share of 
stock A, 20 shares of stock B and 5 shares of C will be bought. 
6 we assume that the settlement price for index futures equal to the index at which arbitrageurs can sell at 
the maturity date. 
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4.3.3 Results of Ex Ante Test 
We relax the assumption that arbitrageurs can execute at their orders. Instead, we 
assume that after the arbitrageurs observe the mispricing signals implied by the results of 
ex post test, they will execute the orders at the first transacted prices after an execution 
lag of 30 seconds. At 10:02:34, the arbitrageurs detect an ex post mispricing signal, they 
begin to execute the index arbitrage orders. Finally they buy the futures at 360，stock A at 
$15，stock B at $5 and stock C at $20. We find that the mispricing signal implied at 
10:02:48 will not result in an ex ante profit. Only the observation at 10:02:34 eventually 
results in a profit. 
To summarize, the test based on reported index reports three mispricings, the ex 
post test using transaction prices of constituent stocks reports two mispricings, and the ex 
ante test reports only one mispricing. This example illustrates that the results of the test 
based on reported index quotations and ex post profits are likely to overestimate the 
frequency of arbitrage opportunities. It also explains how ex ante test overcomes some of 
the inadequacies of the other tests and derives a result likely to approximate the true 
profits realized by arbitrageurs. 
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4.4 Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs play an important role in explaining the size and frequency of 
arbitrage opportunities. An underestimated transaction costs sometimes cause significant 
and persistent mispricings，which indicates an inefficient index futures market. Transaction 
costs vary among different traders. Hence, the availability of arbitrage opportunity is 
different among different kinds of investors. We classify the arbitrageurs into two main 
categories - brokers and institutional investors. The typical transaction costs of Hang Seng 
Index arbitrage include the folio wings: 
(1)brokerage commissions charged for buying and selling stocks in the underlying index; 
(2)stamp duties and transaction fees charged for buying the stocks; 
(3)market impact costs involved in buying and selling stocks in the underlying index; 
(4)brokerage commissions and trading fees charged for buying and selling the HSI futures; 
(5)market impact costs involved in selling and buying the HSI futures; 
(6)the cost of ‘‘borrowing，，the underlying stocks when the stocks in the spot index are 
sold short. 
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Table 3 : Transaction Costs for Hang Seng Index Arbitrage, November 1996 - December 
1996 
._., "… — — — 
institutional investors brokers 
brokerage commissions in 0.25% (one way) 0 
stock market 
stamp duty and transaction levy 0.163% (one way) 0.163%(one way) 
market impact costs in stock 0.327% 0.327% 
market 
brokerage commissions and 16 points approximately 0 
trading fees in futures market 0.13% 
market impact costs in futures 6.06 points approximately 6.06 points or 
market 0.052% approximately 0.052% 
Total transaction costs 1.335% 0.705% 
^^^加 w • “ 默-「. 广 _•_• 
The brokerage commission, transaction levy and stamp duty, that is, item (1) and item (2)， 
do not require further explanation. Item (3)，the market impact cost (MIC) of buying and 
selling the underlying stocks, is the effective bid-ask spread at which arbitrageurs buy and 
sell. It is estimated by the following equation: 
# one spread on stock i market value of stock i 
M I C ~ ^ the mean of daily close of stock i X total market value of the 33 constituent stocks 
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The estimation depends on the crucial assumption that the current bid-ask spread equals 
the effective bid-ask spread regardless of the size of the transaction. 
The total transaction costs estimated is 0.705% for brokers and 1.335% for 
institutional investors. These costs do not account for i)administrative costs to brokers of 
transacting stocks or futures and ii) the cost of “borrowing” stocks for short sales when 
implementing short arbitrage. Furthermore, the transaction costs are not certain because 
the prices at which the position is closed are not known by arbitrageurs when they decide 
to implement the index arbitrage strategy. We report the empirical results at four different 
levels，0.5%, 0.75%, 1% and 1.5%: The transaction costs to brokers are likely to fall 




Data and Preliminary Statistics 
Results of the efficiency tests are based on HSI of the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong and HSI futures traded in Hong Kong Futures Exchange for the period from 1st 
November, 1996 to 31st December, 1996，as a whole 41 trading days. In addition, some 
data are collected from different sources for drawing the charts and graphs, which help to 
understand the market trends. This chapter describes the characteristics and sources of all 
the data used in this paper. It provides important references for readers to interpret the 
results. 
5.1 Data from the Stock Market 
Hang Seng Index (HSI) reported quotations are obtained from the Hang Seng 
Index Services Limited. The quotations are revised at the beginning of every minute and 
computed by the last transacted price of each constituent stock. Moreover, actual 
transaction prices of the thirty three constituent stocks of HSI in the sample period are 
also used to examine the profitability of index arbitrage in the ex post test and ex ante test. 
The data include the transacted prices and times of each constituent stock in the sample 
period. These trading records are time stamped to the nearest second and collected from 
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. 
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Dividend records are collected from "Securities Journal Trading Records" 
published by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. The actual dividends subsequently 
realized over the life of the futures contract are used as a proxy to the dividends expected 
by arbitrageurs at the time of executing the arbitrage strategy. In other words，it is 
assumed that arbitrageurs have perfect knowledge of the amount of dividends paid and ex-
dividend dates. This is only an approximation which may not equal the market 
anticipation. However, the discrepancies between the anticipated dividends and actual 
dividends are small because the blue chips are closely analyzed by market participants. The 
dividend policies of them are stable and fairly predictable. If the ex dividend date of a 
constituent stock is on the current date or between the current date and the expiration date 
of the HSI futures, the dividend is included in testing the violation of the boundary 
conditions. 
The data for plotting the fig. 1 include monthly high, low and close of HSI from 
January 1989 to December 1996. These data are obtained from "the Securities Bulletin" 
published by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. The data for plotting the histogram of 
fig.2，including the market capitalization at the end of each year and the trading value from 
1976 to 1996, are collected from “the Stock Fact Book 1996，，published by the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong. 
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5.2 Data from the Futures Market and Money Market 
The transactions data of HSI futures are similar to those of constituent stocks that 
they contain the transacted prices of each tick and time stamped to the nearest second. 
There is as a whole 64063 observations. The data for plotting fig. 5，which contain the 
monthly trading volume of HSI futures from January 1987 to December 1996, are 
collected from "the Securities Bulletin". 
Because most arbitrageurs are large banks or brokers, they are expected to lend or 
borrow at the Hong Kong interbank market. The market provides short term unsecured 
loans between deposit taking institutions. The market prices，known as Hong Kong 
Interbank Offered rate (HIBOR) is determined by supply and demand forces. The prices 
are usually quoted in the form of bid and offer. The difference between the bid and offer 
price is known as 'spread'. The daily close of HIBOR with the shortest duration and 
maturing on the same day of or the day immediately after the expiration date of the HSI 
contract is used as the estimate of the risk free interest rate. The HIBOR data are collected 
from the "Monthly Statistical Bulletin" published by Hong Kong Monetary Authority. 
Hence, we assume that arbitrageurs lend or borrow at the rate equivalent to the closing 
price of the same day. We ignore the effect of differential borrowing and lending rates and 




This chapter summarizes the empirical results from the tests and examines the 
differences between long arbitrage strategy and short arbitrage strategy. All the test results 
are computed by different MATLAB programs. First, we report the frequency and size of 
violations of futures boundary conditions based on HSI reported index quotations and of 
the ex post mispricing signals. Then the results of ex ante profitability with different 
execution lags are reported. Finally we compare the profitability between long arbitrage 
and short arbitrage. 
6.1 Frequency of Ex Post Mispricings of Futures Prices 
Table 5 reports the frequency and average signal size of ex post violations using 
the transaction prices. Over the entire sample period, the number of mispricings for 0.5% 
transaction costs is 4.28% of total number of observations, indicating a non-trivial 
mispricing signal. However, the frequency of violations of futures boundaries are very 
sensitive to transaction costs. The percentage of mispricings declines sharply from 4.28% 
to 0.58% when transaction costs decrease to 0.75%. The number of mispricings for 1% or 
greater transaction costs is less than 0.15%. These results indicate that some signals of 
profitable arbitrage opportunities exist for brokers, whose transaction costs of 
implementing Hang Seng Index arbitrage is expected to fall between 0.5% to 0.75% of the 
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spot index but do not exist for institutional investors, whose transaction cost is over 1% of 
the spot index. 
The signal size measures the extent of the departures of futures prices from the 
theoretical boundaries. It is the arbitrage profit without taking execution risk into account. 
Signal size can be regarded as a predictor of the size of arbitrage profit. A strong signal 
size is expected to bring a sizeable profit. The results show that the average signal size for 
0.5% transaction costs is 15.84 index points, which decreases to 7.94 when the transaction 
costs increase to 1%. Hence, the arbitrage profit is expected to shrink when transaction 
costs is higher. 
Table 4 reports alternative test based on reported index. Total number of 
observations in the alternative test is a little lower that that in the test based on transaction 
prices. In the alternative test, we use the reported index as a proxy of spot index. The 
observations in the first minute of trading are eliminated because it is not reasonable to 
assume that the spot index is equal to the closing reported index of the last trading day. 
The frequencies of the violations reported by the alternative test for 0.5%, 0.75%, 
1.00% and 1.5% transaction costs are 3803，725 and 141 respectively. Corresponding 
figures in table 5 are 2741，572 and 97 respectively which are all smaller than those in 
table 4. The test using reported index overestimates the frequency of violations because 
one of the constituent stocks such as Johnson Electrics, TVB and Oriental Press are 
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infrequently traded. When any of the constituent stocks is not traded prior to the current 
futures price, the observation will be regarded as unprofitable. When the reported index is 
used, it will report index value even if some of the stocks are not traded yet. 
Table 4: Summary of the Violations of Futures Prices Boundaries when using HSI 
reported index 
Time Number of Observations Transaction costs Number of Violations 
Period 
11/1996 34160 0.5% 1490 (4.36%) 
0.75% 267 (0.78%) 
1.00% 103 (0.30%) 
1.5% 0(0%) 
12/1996 29083 0.5 % 2313 (7.95%) 
0.75% 458 (1.57%) 
1% 38(0.13%) 
1.5% 0(0%) 
Total 63243 0.5% 3803 (6.01%) 
0.75% 725 (1.15%) 
1.0% 141 (0.22%) 
1.5% 0(0%) 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of violations as a percentage of the number of 
observations 
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Table 5: Summary of the Ex Post Violations of Futures Prices Boundaries when using the 
Transaction Prices 
Time Total No: of ^TC No. of Profitable ~Average Signal~ 
period Observations Trades Size 
11/96 34637 0.5% 1160 (3.35%) 13.95 
0.75% 199 (0.57%) 10.51 
1.00% 75 (0.22%) 7.83 
1.5% 0(0%) 0 
12/96 29426 0.5% 1581(5.37%) 17.22 
0.75% 173 (0.59%) 12.45 
1% 22 (0.07%) 8.33 
1.5% 0(0.00%) 0 
Total 64063 0.5% 2741 (4.28%) 15.84 
0.75% 372 (0.58%)) 11.78 
1.00% 97 (0.15%)) 7.94 
1.50% 0 (0.00%) 0 
Note： the figure in the bracket shows the number of violations as a percentage of the number of 
observations 
6.2 Profitability of Hang Seng Index Arbitrage 
6.2.1 Results of Ex Ante Test with an Execution Lag of 30 Seconds 
Table 6 reports the frequency of ex ante arbitrage opportunities with an execution 
lag of 30 seconds. Most of the ex post mispricing signals do not result in profitable ex ante 
arbitrage profit. For 0.5% transaction costs, only 37.43% of the ex post signals bring 
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profitable arbitrage opportunities. This percentage decreases with the increase in 
transaction costs. It is only 22.68% when the transaction costs rise to 1%. 
Signal size brought by ex post violations are poor predictors to the ex ante 
profitability. The average profits realized are 0.95, -9.09 and -15.66 for 0.5%, 0.75% and 
1% transaction costs but the average signal sizes implied by ex post violations are 15.84, 
11.78 and 7.94 respectively. The standard deviation of average profits is a measure of the 
risk of the index arbitrage. It is found that the standard deviations are in general above 20 
index points and increase with the transaction costs. 
These results can be summarized as follows, i) Even though ex post violations 
signal the opportunity of exploiting a large arbitrage profit, on average index arbitrage is 
not very profitable. Most of the arbitrage opportunities are not persistent and vanish 
within the short execution lag. This result suggests that the HSI futures market is quite 
efficient. The mispricing reversals are so quick that formal arbitrage can hardly exploit a 
large amount of profit. The average profit realized for 0.5% transaction costs is less than 
one index point and smaller than zero for higher transaction costs. The higher the 
transaction costs, the greater is the loss incurred, ii) index arbitrage is quite risky because 
profitable ex post arbitrage signals often turn out to be a negative ex ante profit. The size 
of profit or loss is uncertain as the standard deviation of the average profit is large relative 
to the average profit. 
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Table 10: Summary of Arbitrage Profitability with an Execution Lag of Five Minutes 
Time Transaction Number of Average Average Std. 
Period costs Violations Signal Size Profits Dev … 
……•.11/1996 0."5% 13.95 1.47 22.13 
0.75% 53 (26.63%) 10.51 -8 .24 22.23 
1% 17 (22.67%) 7.83 -15.56 24.74 
12/1996 0.5% 566 (35.80%) 17.22 0.56 21.12 
0.75% 44 (25.47%) 12.45 -9.55 21.84 
0.1% 5 (22.73%) 8.33 -16.01 24.55 
Total 0.5% 1026 (37.43%) 15.84 0.95 21.56 
0.75% 97 (26.07%) 11.78 -9.09 22.06 
1% 22 (22.68%) 7.94 -15.66 24,70 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of ex ante violations as a percentage of the number of ex 
post violations 
6.2.2 Results of Ex Ante Test with an Execution Lag longer than 30 Seconds 
Table 7 to 10 summarize the frequency and size of ex ante profits as the execution 
lag increases from 1 minute to 5 minute. When the execution lag rises from 30 seconds to 
2 minutes, the number of violations drop from 1026 to 913 for 0.5% transaction costs. 
The rate of the decline slows down for further increase in execution time. The number of 
violations only drops 30 more to 883 when the execution lag rises to 5 minutes. Longer 
execution lag gives rise to more negative ex ante profit. When execution lag rises to above 
two minutes, average profits are all smaller than zero. 
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The effect of the increase in execution lag can be summarized as follows. i)after an 
execution lag of 5 minutes, the frequency of profitable arbitrage opportunities is 
significantly reduced but cannot be all eliminated, ii) Longer execution lag results in 
greater loss from implementing the index arbitrage. It makes average signal size of ex post 
violations a poorer predictor for arbitrage profitability, iii) the degree of risk does not 
increase with the longer execution lag as no significant change in standard deviation for 
longer execution lag can be observed. 
Table 7: Summary of Arbitrage Profitability with an Execution Lag of One Minute. 
— T i m e Transaction Number of Average Average Std. 
Period costs Violations Signal Size 总碎 PfY.……. 
….…11/19% 0.5% 446(38*45%) 辽：远 l'.OO 22.27 
� 0.75% 51 (25.63%) 10.51 -8.43 22.54 
1.00% 15 (20.00%) 7.83 -15.49 24.29 
12/1996 0.5% 513 (32.45%) 17.22 0.92 21.5 
0.75% 40 (23.12%) 12.45 -6.25 22.04 
1.00% 3 (13.64%) 8.33 -16.35 23.99 
Total 0.5% 959 (34.99%) 15.84 0.95 21.83 
0 75% 91 (24.46%) 11.78 -7.42 22.24 
1 % 18(18.56%) 7.94 -15.69 24.22 
v V •••nririnrinririiUj^ ji.ru i^-Lruwn.ii.nruvyirLrLnfVLrLruiftArLnruijVLrAAryLriAn-ruvMWijiftfi*!*!产遍 
--.••-nnndiinftflj^u^vu^j-zjuvyjwjvjuvovuinjVLanrj-LnAfu-ui/WLAAfLAru-LnjwvLfWij-uijinnnAfiriAivuvi.nji 广r..i 里 • • 丨 八 「 厂 " “ 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of ex ante violations as a percentage of the number of ex 
post violations 
55 
Table 10: Summary of Arbitrage Profitability with an Execution Lag of Five Minutes 
Time Transaction Number of Average Average Std. 
Period costs Violations Signal Size Profits Dev 
•…11/1996 o"5%"" '419(3612%)'": 13.95 0.33 22^ 46•… 
0.75% 48 (24.12%) 10.51 -8.53 22.86 
1.0% 13(17.33%) 7.83 -16.17 24.76 
12/1996 0.5% 494 (31.25%) 17.22 -1.08 21.68 
0.75% 38(21.97%) 12.45 -9.32 22.24 
1% 3 (13.64%) 8.33 -17.84 24.87 
Total 0.5% 913 (33.31%) 15.84 -0.48 22.02 
0.75% 86(23.12%) 11.78 -8.85 22.46 
1% 16 (16.49%) 7.94 -16.55 24.79 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of ex ante violations as a percentage of the number of ex 
post violations 
Table 9: Summary of Arbitrage Profitability with an Execution Lag of Three Minutes 
Time Transaction Number of Average Average Std. 
Period costs Violations Signal Size Profits Dev … 
…….11/1996 0.5% 4147'35^69%) ••…“.…13"95 22.37 
0.75% 39(19.60%) 10.51 -9.23 23.15 
1.00% 12(16%) 7.83 -15.77 24.98 
12/1996 0.5% 487(30.80%) 17.22 -2.29 21.23 
0.75% 34 (19.65%) 12.45 -10.45 22.47 
1.00% 4(18.18%) 8.33 -19.29 24.32 
Total 0.5% 901(32.87%) 15.84 -1.90 21.72 
0.75% 73(19.62%) 11.78 -10.03 22.84 
1.00% 16(16.49%) 7.94 -16.57 24.88 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of ex ante violations as a percentage of the number of ex 
post violations 
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Table 10: Summary of Arbitrage Profitability with an Execution Lag of Five Minutes 
Time Transaction Number of Average Average Std. 
Period costs Violations Signal Size Profits Dev 
•…Il7l996 0"S% … 巧 13"；95 :3.:¾ 22.42… 
0.75% 43 (21.61%) 10.51 -13.91 23.12 
1.0% 11 (14.67%) 7.83 -20.32 24.75 
12/1996 0.5% 472 (29.85%) 17.22 -5.97 21.8 
0.75% 34 (19.65%) 12.45 -14.03 22.48 
1.0% 4(18.18%) 8.33 -20.93 24.63 
Total 0.5% 883 (32.21%) 15.84 -4.83 22.10 
0.75 % 77(20.70%) 11.78 -13.99 22.70 
1,0 % 15 (15.46%) T94 -20.46 24.72 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of ex ante violations as a percentage of the number of ex 
post violations 
6.3 Comparison of Long Arbitrage Profitability and Short Arbitrage Profitability 
When HSI futures are transacted at a premium above the theoretical level and the 
premium is above the transaction costs, arbitrageurs will profit from shorting futures, 
buying constituent stocks and borrowing money at the risk free rate. This is known as long 
arbitrage strategy. Conversely, arbitrageurs implement short arbitrage strategy, which buys 
futures, short sells stocks and lends money at the risk free rate，when the futures are 
transacted at a discount on the theoretical level which is larger than the transaction costs. 
As institutional and market factors may have different impacts on the two sets of 
strategies. The processes of their mispricing reversals and market efficiencies may not be 
exactly equal. 
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6.3.1 Comparison of Ex Post Violations between Long Arbitrage and Short 
Arbitrage 
The results from Table 11 indicate that for 0.5% transaction costs, 2197 out of 
2741 ex post mispricing signals are overpriced signals. The frequency of underpricings is 
much smaller than that of overpricings. The same results exist for higher transaction costs. 
The average signal size of long arbitrage profitability is higher than that of short arbitrage 
profitability. For 0.5% transaction costs, long arbitrage implies an average signal of 16.31 
index points whereas short arbitrage only implies 13.91. 
Table 11: Summary of Ex Post Violations of Long Arbitrage Strategy and Short Arbitrage 
Strategy 
time period TC No. of violations average signal size 
long short long short 
11/96 0.5% 964(83.10%) 196(16.90%) 14.37 11.88 
0.75% 183 (91.96%) 16(8.04%) 10.63 9.14 
1% 73(97.33%) 2(2.67%) 7.85 7.11 
12/96 0.5% 1233(77.99%) 348 (22.01%) 17.83 15.06 
0.75% 119(69.19%) 54(30.81%) 12.91 11.43 
1% 22 (100%) 0 8.33 
Total 0.5% 2197(80.15%) 544(19.85%) 16.31 13.91 
0.75% 302(76.34%) 70(23.66%) 11.52 10.91 
1% 95(97.94%) 2(2.06%) 7.96 7.11 
Note: The figure in the bracket shows the mispricing signals indicated by that strategy as a percentage of 
total mispricing signals 
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6.3.2 Comparison of Ex Ante Profitability between Long Arbitrage and Short 
Arbitrage 
After an execution lag of 30 seconds is taken into account, ft is found that the 
number of profitable trades as a percentage of mispricing signal is higher for overpriced 
futures is higher than that for underpriced futures. The average profits exploited by long 
arbitrage strategy are also higher than those exploited by short arbitrage strategy. The 
index futures market appears to be more efficient when the futures are sold at a discount. 
These results are consistent with our assumption in Chapter 2 that the effect of collateral 
requirement is minimal. In addition, arbitrageurs seem to be able to borrow securities 
within a very short time or they are able to carry out 'quasi，short arbitrage. 
The standard deviations of long arbitrage profits are slightly higher than those of 
short arbitrage profits. This result indicates that the risk of taking profit from long 
arbitrage is higher than that of taking profit from short arbitrage. The more active 
speculation on overpriced futures may be a feasible explanation. It increases the volatility 
of overpriced futures, thus resulting in more variable payoffs from the futures transaction 
in implementing long arbitrage strategy. 
As the execution lag increases, the number of profitable trades declines for both 
long and short arbitrage strategy. When long arbitrage is used, the percentage of profitable 
trades declines from 38.51% to 35% as the execution lag rises from 30 seconds to 5 
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minutes. When short arbitrage is used, this percentage declines from 33.09% to 20.69%. 
The rate of the decline for long arbitrage is less rapid than the decline for short arbitrage. 
The results support that the market eliminate the short arbitrage opportunities faster than 
the long arbitrage opportunities. The standard deviations of ex ante profitability for both 
long arbitrage and short arbitrage do not significantly increase or decrease for different 
transaction costs. It indicates that the riskness of realizing the profits from both strategies 
do not change too much as execution time is longer. 
Table 12: Summary of Long Arbitrage Profitability and Short Arbitrage Profitability with 
an Execution Lag of 30 Seconds ； ； 
time period TC No. of profitable trades Average Profits Std. Dev 
long short long short long short 
H/96 0 5% 397(41.18%) 63(32.14%) 1.55 1.08 22.24 21.58 
0 75% 50(27.32%) 3(18.75%) -7.92 -11.90 22.63 17.00 
l� /0 17(22.67%) 0 -15.49 -18.12 24.95 15.21 
12/96 0 5% 449(36.42%) 117(33.62%) 0.63 0.31 21.69 18.96 
0.75% 31(26.05%) 13(24.07%) -9.22 -10.28 22.13 21.19 
1% 5(22.73%) 0 -16.01 24.55 
Total 0 5% 846(38.51%) 180(33.09%) 0.83 0.59 21.93 19.95 
0 75% 81(26.82%) 16(22.86%) -8.43 -10.65 22.43 20.31 
lo/0 22(23.16%) 0 -15.61 -18.12 24.86 15.21 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of profitable trades from that strategy as a percentage of 
the mispricing signal from the same strategy 
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Table 13 : Summary of Long Arbitrage Profitability and Short Arbitrage Profitability with 
an Execution Lag of One Minute 
time period TC No. of profitable trades Average Profits Std. Dev 
long short long short long short 
11/96 0.5% 389(40.35%) 57(29.08%) 1.05 0.75 22.56 20.78 
0.75% 48 (26.23%) 3(18.75%) -7.97 -13.69 22.83 18.91 
• 1% 15(22.67%) 0 -15.23 -24.98 24.39 20.31 
12/96 0.5% 419(33.98%) 94(27.01%) 0.97 0.74 21.96 20.81 
0.75% 31(26.05%) 9(16.67%) -6.01 -6.78 22.02 21.68 
1% 3(13.67%) 0 -16.35 24.06 
Total 0.5% 838(38.14%) 151(27.76%) 0.88 0.75 22.08 20.80 
0.75% 79(26.16%) 12(17,14%) -7.20 -8.36 22.58 21.08 
1% 18(18.95%) 0 -15.49 -24.98 24.31 20.31 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of profitable trades from that strategy as a percentage of 
the mispricing signal from the same strategy 
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The rate of the decline for long arbitrage is less rapid than the decline for short arbitrage. 
The results support that the market eliminate the short arbitrage opportunities faster than 
the long arbitrage opportunities. The standard deviations of ex ante profitability for both 
long arbitrage and short arbitrage do not significantly increase or decrease for different 
transaction costs. It indicates that the riskness of realizing the profits from both strategies 
do not change too much as execution time is longer. 
Table 12: Summary of Long Arbitrage Profitability and Short Arbitrage Profitability with 
an Execution Lag of 30 Seconds 
time period TC No. o之pi^^^yeng?? AY.?.riS.?..?I9.?!i?. ？ 
long short long short long short 
11/96 0.5% 397(41.18%) 63(32.14%) 1.55 1.08 22.24 21.58 
0.75% 50(27.32%) 3(18.75%) -7.92 -11.90 22.63 17.00 
1% 17(22.67%) 0 -15.49 -18.12 24.95 15.21 
12/96 0.5% 449(36.42%) 117(33.62%) 0.63 0.31 21.69 18.96 
0.75% 31(26.05%) 13(24.07%) -9.22 -10.28 22.13 21.19 
1% 5(22.73%) 0 -16.01 24.55 
Total 0.5% 846(38.51%) 180(33,09%) 0.83 0.59 21.93 19.95 
0 75% 81(26.82%) 16(22.86%) -8.43 -10.65 22.43 20.31 
1% 22(23.16%) 0 -15.61 -18.12 24.86 15.21 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of profitable trades from that strategy as a percentage of 
the mispricing signal from the same strategy 
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Table 14: Summary of Long Arbitrage Profitability and Short Arbitrage Profitability with 
an Execution Lag of Two Minutes 
time period TC No. of profitable trades Average Profits Std. Dev 
long short long short long short 
11/96 0.5% 376 (38.49%) 43(21.94%) 0.35 0.23 22.51 22.21 
0.75% 46(25.14%) 2(12.5%) -8.47 -9.22 22.93 22.04 
1% 13(17.81%) 0 -15.99 -22.74 24.79 23.64 
12/96 0.5% 408(33.09%) 86(24.71%) -1.02 -1.29 21.75 21.43 
0.75% 30(25.21%) 8(14.81%) -9.21 -9.56 22.30 22.11 
1% 3(13.67%) 0 -17.84 24.92 
Total 0.5% 784(35.69%) 129(23.71%) -0.42 -0.74 22.09 21.72 
0.75% 76(25.17%) 10(14.29%) -8.76 -9.48 22.68 22.09 
1% 16(16.84%) 0 -16.42 -22.74 24.82 23.64 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of profitable trades from that strategy as a percentage of 
the mispricing signal from the same strategy 
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Table 15: Summary of Long Arbitrage Profitability and Short Arbitrage Profitability with 
an Execution Lag of Three Minutes 
time period TC No. of profitable trades Average Profits Std. Dev 
long short long short long short 
11/96 0.5% 371(38.49%) 43(21.94%) -1.29 -1.82 22.39 22.27 
0.75% 37(20.22%) 2(12.5%) -9.01 -11.75 23.20 22.57 
1% 11(15 .07%) 0 -15 .51 -25 .26 25 .03 23.08 
12/96 0.5% 406(32.93%) 81(23.28%) -2.11 -2.93 21.28 21.05 
0.75% 29(24.37%) 5(9.26%) -10.22 -10.96 22.54 24.89 
1% 5 0 -19.29 24.50 
Total 0.5% 777(35.37%) 124(22.79%) -1.75 -2.53 21.77 21.50 
0.75% 66(21.85%) 7(10%) -9.49 -11.14 22.94 22.37 
1% 16(16.84%) 0 -16.39 -25.26 24.91 23.08 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of profitable trades from that strategy as a percentage of 
the mispricing signal from the same strategy 
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Table 16: Summary of Long Arbitrage Profitability and Short Arbitrage Profitability with 
an Execution Lag of Five Minutes 
time period TC No. of profitable trades Average Profits Std. Dev 
long short long short long short 
11/96 0.5% 368(38.17%) 43(21.94%) -3.19 -3.72 22.49 22.07 
0.75% 40(21.86%) 3(18.75%) -13.85 -14.60 23.19 22.30 
1% 11(15 .07%) 0 -20 .22 -23 .97 24 .89 18.94 
12/96 0.5% 401(32.52%) 71(20.4%) -5.94 -6.08 21.91 21.41 
0.75% 29(24.37%) 5(9.26%) -13.95 -14.21 22.56 22.30 
1% 4(18.18%) 0 -20.88 24.70 
Total 0.5% 769(35%) 114(20.96%) -4.73 -5.23 22.17 21.64 
0.75% 69(22.85%) 8(11.43%) -13.89 -14.30 22.94 22.30 
1% 15(15.79%) 0 -20.37 -23.97 24.85 18.94 
Note: the figure in the bracket shows the number of profitable trades from that strategy as a percentage of 




This paper tests the efficiency of Hang Seng Index futures market by examining 
the ex ante profitability of index arbitrage. The cost-of-carry model is the cornerstone of 
the pricing relationship between index futures and stock indices. This model is adapted for 
incorporating the effect of execution lags and transaction costs. The orders of the simple 
arbitrage strategy implicit in the model are simulated on the tick-by-tick transactions data 
of HSI futures and those of the constituent stocks of HSI for the sample period of 1st 
November 1996 to 31st December 1996. 
Results of ex ante efficiency test provide different answers to index arbitrage 
profitability from those of ex post efficiency tests. Although the frequency of ex post 
violations of futures boundary conditions is non-trivial and the violations predict 
significant amount of profits available, the mispricing reversals of the futures are so fast 
that most mispricing signals are eliminated within the short execution time. Only limited 
arbitrage opportunities exist for brokers and no arbitrage opportunity exists for 
institutional brokers. The average profits exploited from the opportunities are small and 
the standard deviations of the profits are large relative to the level of the average profits. 
Hence, the observed prices are not reliable predictors of profitability. The evidence 
generally supports that Hang Seng Index futures market is efficient with respect to the 
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simple arbitrage strategy. The non-zero returns to brokers from the arbitrage can be 
explained as the premium of execution risk. 
The statistics provided by the Hong Kong Futures Exchange report that about 
10% of total HSI futures are for the purpose of arbitrage at the end of 1996. The limited 
arbitrage opportunities found in our efficiency seem to be not consistent with the statistics. 
One feasible explanation is that some arbitrageurs use more sophisticated arbitrage 
strategies such as closing the position before the expiration. However, this does not imply 
that the market is not efficient because more sophisticated strategies may involve higher 
transaction costs or execution risks. For example, if arbitrageurs close the position before 
the expiration of the futures contract, taking offsetting position in the futures market 
involves additional execution risk because it is likely that arbitrageurs cannot offset the 
position at the exact prices they want as a result of fast mispricing reversals compared to 
the execution time. In addition, transaction costs for the early liquidation are higher than 
those for the simple strategy of holding the position to the expiration as taking offsetting 
position in futures market requires additional brokerage fees. Another possible strategy is 
that arbitrageurs can ignore some infrequently traded stocks and increase the shares of 
other liquid stocks, while keeping other trades of the strategy the same. In the 33 
constituent stocks of Hang Seng Index, infrequently traded stocks are most likely to be the 
small capitalized stocks. Ignoring the stocks affects the spot index a little but may increase 
the number of arbitrage opportunities. This strategy is obviously riskier than the simple 
strategy and can be regarded as stock investment with hedging by HSI futures contracts. 
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The demarcation between arbitrage and portfolio investment becomes ambiguous. All in 
all, it is likely that the increase in arbitrage opportunities from other arbitrage strategies is 
justified by their higher risk premium. An index arbitrage strategy may only be one type of 
technical trading rule with its own risk and return characteristics but can hardly generate 
above average return. However, further studies are needed to provide evidence on this 
issue. 
The low arbitrage profitability of Hang Seng Index futures market does not imply 
that Hang Seng Index futures are reliable instruments for hedging the market risk in 
portfolio management. The transaction costs for the simple arbitrage strategy in Hong 
Kong, which are estimated to be 0.705% for brokers and 1.335% for institutional 
investors, are not trivial. Basis variaMlity may still be so sizeable that undermines the 
hedging effectiveness of HSI futures. The measures of lowering the transaction costs for 
stock trading or futures trading such as negotiable commissions are possible to increase 
arbitrage activity and reduce the basis variability. 
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Fig.6 Daily Basis Points, 1st Nov 96 - 31st Dec 96 
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When comparing the efficiencies of overpriced futures and underpriced futures, we 
find that the number of overpriced futures is significantly higher than the number of 
underpriced futures. This result contradicts the evidence found in many studies on the 
U.S. market and Japanese market, which document a larger percentage of underpriced 
futures than that of overpriced futures. The difference can be explained by some factors. 
i)No capital gains tax is imposed in Hong Kong that the tax timing option does not exist in 
Hang Seng Index arbitrage. ii)Short sale restrictions have been significantly relaxed in 
Hong Kong. The abolition of uptick rule is particularly important. We expect that short 
sale restrictions in Hong Kong have minimal effect. iii)Hang Seng Index has risen almost 
every year from 1990 to 1996. In the last quarter of 1996, the market experienced another 
wave of rally. The market sentiment is generally very bullish at the end of 1996. Because it 
is much less risky to speculate on the increase in price than on the decline of it, the 
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speculative activities in HSI futures market tend to concentrate on an upward movement 
of futures prices. The difference in speculative activity may account for the fact that 
overpriced futures were more frequent than underpriced ones in our sample period. 
The conclusions drawn from this paper are generally consistent with the evidence 
on the U.S. and Japanese markets of the recent studies. Over a history of more than ten 
years, the Hang Seng Index futures are highly liquid and extensively participated by local 
and international investors. The market has become mature so that most traders are 
familiar with the implementation of arbitrage. It can be expected that the arbitrage 
profitability can hardly be more than the level explained by its execution risk. However, 
the high transaction costs in Hong Kong still contribute to the substantial basis variability 
that makes hedging difficult. Our tests report that the number of overpriced futures 
contracts is higher than that of underpriced ones, a result different from the evidence of 
other markets. This can be attributed to the lax regulations imposed on futures and stock 
trading in Hong Kong，as well as the speculative activities at the end of 1996. 
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